World Politics Review
21-10-13

Future of Enrichment ‘Gold Standard’ in Doubt After U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Deal

Earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh signed an agreement to enable future civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. While the text has not been made public, it appears that the agreement will not include a so-called Gold Standard provision proscribing Vietnam from enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium.

The agreement marks the latest installment in a decade-long effort by the United States and other major nuclear powers to limit the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies (ENR), which can provide both fuel for nuclear power and fissile material for nuclear weapons. Controversies over the terms of this and potential future U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements illustrate that such efforts are likely to be contentious and partially successful at best.

How did we reach this impasse? In 2002-2003 it was revealed that Iran had been clandestinely enriching uranium at undeclared facilities. Soon after, Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist A.Q. Khan was exposed as the leader of an illicit nuclear trafficking network, which had sold enrichment technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. These developments sparked concerns that a new wave of countries would acquire enrichment technology, claiming like Iran that that they were doing so for peaceful purposes within the bounds of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In reaction, U.S. President George W. Bush called for the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to “refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants.” Previous NSG rules simply urged members to exercise restraint in such transfers.

The international community, however, was sharply divided. Many NPT non-nuclear weapon states argued that the treaty granted them an inalienable right to pursue ENR technologies under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Several NSG members, including Turkey and Brazil, shared this perspective, and successfully watered down U.S.-led reform efforts.   

Nor does comprehensive multilateral control of the fuel cycle appeal to many nuclear weapon states, who would have to surrender national control of ENR facilities, or non-nuclear weapon states, who perceive most proposals as discriminatory. Instead, states have approved a baby step toward multilateral control, a nuclear fuel bank to assure countries of a backup supply in case of market interruptions, obviating the need for states with supply security concerns to build their own enrichment facilities.  

Meanwhile, despite international sanctions, Iran has continued its enrichment program. U.S. officials say the program is not needed for civilian purposes, as Russia supplies fuel for Iran’s only power reactor at Bushehr, and Iran already has more material than it needs for its Tehran research reactor. Building on last week’s talks in Geneva, the U.S. hopes that Iran will pledge to limit its enrichment capability in return for sanctions relief.

How does all this relate to the U.S.-Vietnam agreement? The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 legalizing nuclear commerce required the U.S. government to conclude Section 123 agreements with prospective foreign partners. The preconditions for such “123” agreements have generally become stricter over time, but inconsistencies among them have become increasingly controversial.

Historically, U.S. partners were required to be parties to the NPT, thereby offering a peaceful nuclear carrot to countries that joined the nonproliferation regime. But in 2008 the Bush administration convinced Congress and the NSG to grant an exception to permit nuclear commerce with India. Alongside Euratom and Japan, the U.S. provided India with consent to enrich and reprocess U.S.-origin materials, which is forbidden under standard 123 agreements with NPT non-nuclear weapon states without prior consent.

At the other end of the spectrum is the 2008 agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates, in which the UAE voluntarily agreed to forego development of ENR capabilities. While many in the U.S. Congress believe all new and renewed 123 agreements should include such a Gold Standard provision, only Taiwan has so far indicated receptiveness to such preconditions, which other major nuclear suppliers do not demand.

Reports suggest that the Vietnam deal does not include the Gold Standard. However, Vietnam, which already has nuclear cooperation agreements with other suppliers, is said to have committed less formally to indefinitely foregoing ENR. The Vietnam agreement also includes the standard limitations on modification of U.S.-origin material.  

Meanwhile, a formal review of U.S. nuclear cooperation policy has been stalled at the White House for nearly two years. That review, requested by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, sought to have the White House adjudicate between lower-level officials who support a case-by-case approach to ENR restrictions and lawmakers on Capitol Hill who prefer requiring a Gold Standard clause.

In opting for a middle-ground agreement with Vietnam, the administration appears to have endorsed the case-by-case approach in practice. What this will mean for future agreements remains unclear. Aside from the Taiwan agreement, the two most pressing pacts are with Saudi Arabia and South Korea. The administration is under heavy pressure from Congress and other regional actors to require a Gold Standard commitment from Saudi Arabia. South Korea, a global nuclear industry leader, not only will refuse the Gold Standard, but also wants broad U.S. consent to enrich and reprocess U.S.-origin materials. While a firm legal commitment from Vietnam to refrain from ENR would no doubt have strengthened the U.S. negotiating position with Saudi Arabia and other countries, the outcome of ongoing negotiations with Iran may ultimately matter most.

However, concerns about a mass rush to enrichment and reprocessing appear to be overblown. Recent experience suggests only illicit nuclear suppliers are willing to sell ENR to states currently lacking fuel cycle capabilities. As such, the Gold Standard, multilateral fuel cycle approaches and other would-be magic bullets are solutions in search of a problem; all apply to legitimate suppliers and end-users. Faced with global economic malaise and a stunted nuclear renaissance, most states will forego ENR, not because they are required to, but because such capabilities are uneconomical and fail to offer compelling value-added to small-scale nuclear power programs.

Miles Pomper is senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, D.C.

Jessica C. Varnum is the Nuclear Threat Initiative project manager at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and an adjunct professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Varnum teaches graduate-level coursework on nuclear energy and nonproliferation, and also researches and publishes extensively on U.S.-Turkey-NATO nuclear policies.