Japanese diplomacy during the Cambodian peace process and Japan’s post-Cold War role in Southeast Asia: the legacy of the Fukuda Doctrine, 1989–1993

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Abstract: Japan’s role during the Cambodian peace process after 1989 is often considered a successful case of post-Second World War Japanese diplomacy. In contrast to claims in the existing literature that Japan began to consider and initiated its involvement in the settlement only beginning in the late 1980s, this article demonstrates that Tokyo’s role built upon a diplomatic platform that the Japanese had constructed through peace efforts since the Cambodian conflict erupted in 1979. The policy framework, objectives and initiatives of Japan’s Cambodia diplomacy during the peace process represented the culmination of a ten-year diplomatic endeavour. Ultimately, Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian settlement, guided by its Southeast Asia strategy of promoting coexistence and cooperation between ASEAN and Indochina, legitimated and favoured Japan’s attempts to expand its post-Cold War role in regional political and security affairs.

Keywords: Japanese diplomacy, Cambodian conflict, Fukuda Doctrine, Southeast Asia

Introduction

This article investigates Japanese efforts to play a political and security role in Southeast Asia during the waning phase of the Cold War and at the outset of the post-Cold War period. The focus is on Japan’s contribution to the final part of the peace process, between 1989 and 1993, aimed at settling the Cambodian conflict (1979–1993), which was a regional war with global implications, as it occurred in
the context of the Cold War confrontation in Asia. In 1989, an international conference to settle the conflict was finally held in Paris, marking the beginning of the official phase of the peace process. Two years later, the conference was convened again and concluded with the signing of peace agreements. Since early 1990, the UN Security Council permanent members (P5) had intensified their involvement in the negotiations, which contributed to increased international attention towards the Cambodian peace process. From the time the conflict erupted, Japan played an unprecedented constructive diplomatic role in facilitating the attainment of peace and, during the final part of the settlement, Tokyo strove to be actively involved in peace efforts by signalling its determination to enhance its regional role in political matters and to establish its position in post-Cold War Southeast Asia.

This study seeks to explain Japan’s role in the peace process after 1989 by situating it in relation to previous Japanese diplomatic efforts on the Cambodian problem. This research also discusses the link between the Japanese contribution to the Cambodian settlement and Tokyo’s regional role in the initial years of the post-Cold War period. These two aspects are analysed in the context of Japan’s pursuit of its Southeast Asia strategy as formulated in the 1970s, which aimed simultaneously to realise a regional order that guaranteed peace and stability and to allow Japan to assume a position of influence. These goals were addressed in the so-called Fukuda Doctrine, ‘the first postwar Japanese foreign policy initiative’¹ (Watanabe 2000, p. 304), which was proclaimed by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in Manila in 1977. In addition to affirming that Japan would never become a military power and that it wanted to develop relations with Southeast Asian nations based on mutual trust, the doctrine’s third pillar outlined Japan’s determination to achieve regional peace and prosperity by strengthening the resilience of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and promoting peaceful and cooperative relations between ASEAN and Indochina. The latter point, referring to the intra-regional bridging role, was expected to enhance Japan’s political status in the region and in global affairs. By seeking to realise coexistence and stability in Southeast Asia, the Fukuda Doctrine was an attempt to prevent the Soviet Union or China from assuming a role in that region because of the reduced US presence following the Vietnam War. The doctrine also represented a plan to benefit from Japan’s willingness to pursue an independent regional policy that reflected its own national interest.

However, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia led to the deterioration of ASEAN-Vietnam relations, which complicated Japan’s plan to act as a bridge in the region. In addition, this event facilitated the expansion of the Soviet and Chinese influence into Southeast Asia, further impeding Japan’s pursuit of its regional policy. The heightening of Cold War tension following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 posed a further challenge to the Japanese strategy in Southeast Asia because it complicated Tokyo’s pursuit of its policy towards the Soviet-backed Vietnam.
In the existing literature, Japan’s initial involvement in efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict has been traced to the late 1980s (Tomoda 1992, pp. 46–47; Soeya 1997, p. 187; Takeda 1998, p. 554; Lam 2009, p. 39), when Japan departed from the passive diplomacy efforts (Imagawa 2008, p. 63) with respect to Cambodia that it had followed since the conflict began and that were limited to supporting the ASEAN stance (Tomoda 1992, pp. 44, 46; Kōno 1999, p. 24). Japan’s initial manifestation of its willingness to play a role in peace efforts occurred in 1988 on the occasion of Prince Sihanouk’s visit to Japan (Tomoda 1992, p. 47; Soeya 1997, p. 187) and at the Paris conference on Cambodia during the following year (Soeya 1997, p. 187). At the time of Sihanouk’s visit to Tokyo, ‘Japan had no clear conception of the role it would play in the Cambodian peace process’ (Tomoda 1992, p. 47). Prime Minister Takeshita’s 1988 launch of an initiative establishing Japan’s willingness to play a role in solving regional conflicts was also an indication of Japan’s emerging role in the negotiations (Takeda 1998, p. 554). Therefore, the Cambodian peace process ‘was the first occasion on which Japan clearly and deliberately attempted to play a political role in Asian affairs’ (Tomoda 1992, p. 43). Facilitated by international political changes that created more favourable conditions for a settlement of the conflict, beginning in 1988, ‘Japan abandoned its policy of rigid conformity to the ASEAN position and began to search for an independent solution’. This marked one response to international pressure on Japan to shoulder more of the burden of world affairs (Tomoda 1992, p. 46). In other words, existing analyses treat Japan’s involvement in the peace process as a new development in Japanese diplomacy that began after 1988.

Based on a historical perspective and drawing on Japanese and overseas declassified documents and other primary sources, this article proposes a different interpretation of Japanese diplomacy in the final part of the Cambodian peace process. This research argues that Japan’s role represented the continuation and culmination of diplomatic endeavours that Tokyo had been conducting in the ten years between the outbreak of the conflict and the final part of the peace process. This article also seeks to demonstrate that Tokyo’s contribution to the Cambodian settlement after 1989, which was guided by the Fukuda Doctrine promulgated in 1977, favoured the expansion of Japan’s post-Cold War role in political and security issues in Southeast Asia.

This study offers a contribution to the academic debate on the nature of Japanese postwar foreign policy. Although some scholars have posited that Tokyo’s foreign policy has been reactive,² this article shows that Japanese diplomacy with respect to Southeast Asia at the time of the Cambodian conflict represented a proactive pursuit of Japan’s own original foreign policy initiative. The difference between Japan’s Vietnam policy and the American and Chinese postures vis-à-vis Hanoi contributes to our understanding of Tokyo’s positive pursuit of its strategy in Southeast Asia. Washington, which was still affected by the legacy of the Vietnam War and reacting to the tightened Soviet-Vietnamese relations following their 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, approached the Cambodian
problem as a Cold War conflict by adopting a tough anti-Vietnam stance aimed at isolating Hanoi politically and economically. The normalisation of Sino-American relations in 1979 created an ideologically heterogeneous alignment between the US and China that aimed to contain the Soviet Union’s attempts to expand its influence in Asia. China viewed Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia as part of the Soviet strategy of hegemonic expansion in the region; hence, Beijing strongly supported the Khmer Rouge’s guerrilla actions against the Vietnam-backed Phnom Penh government and thus adopted a harsh anti-Vietnam posture designed to isolate Hanoi and dissipate its resources.

The Americans and Chinese aimed to isolate Hanoi internationally and from its ASEAN neighbours, whereas Japan’s policy worked in the opposite direction: Tokyo actively worked to reduce the distance between ASEAN and the Vietnamese in the Cambodian conflict and to engage with Hanoi. Based on the Fukuda Doctrine, this approach stemmed from the strategic importance of Southeast Asia for Japan not only as a source of raw materials, a market and an area crossed by a major sea-lane through which vital oil supplies were shipped to Japan but also because Tokyo, by strengthening its role in this region, could enhance its political stature in world affairs.

Given Japan’s above-mentioned difficulty in acting as a bridge between ASEAN and Vietnam after the conflict commenced in Cambodia, Tokyo’s involvement in the peace settlement demonstrates its commitment to implementing the Fukuda Doctrine. This case marked a significant development in Japan’s post-Second World War diplomacy because Tokyo expanded the scope of its foreign policy beyond the traditional focus on economic affairs by playing an unprecedented active role in conflict resolution in Cambodia.

Two major aspects are examined in this article. The first aspect is the relationship between Japanese diplomatic initiatives during the peace process after 1989 and Tokyo’s diplomacy with respect to the Cambodian problem – and, more generally, with respect to Southeast Asia – during the previous decade. The second aspect to be explored is the role of the Fukuda Doctrine in the final part of the peace process and as a basis for Japanese political and security initiatives in Southeast Asia during the early stages of the post-Cold War era. To trace the journey of these two aspects, the following section briefly outlines Japanese diplomacy from the outbreak of the Cambodian conflict to the late 1980s.

**Japan’s diplomacy in the ten years before the final part of the peace process**

In December 1978, Vietnamese troops, supported by Cambodian forces led by Heng Samrin, invaded Cambodia. On 7 January 1979, they assumed control of Phnom Penh and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea was subsequently established. The Khmer Rouge, which had ruled Cambodia since April 1975 with an iron fist under the leadership of Pol Pot, resulting in the death of approximately
1.67 million Cambodians (Kiernan 1996, p. 458), withdrew to areas along the Thai-Cambodian border, from which they conducted guerrilla warfare. In addition to the Khmer Rouge, which was militarily the strongest resistance faction, the fight against the Vietnam-backed Phnom Penh government and the Vietnamese troops in Cambodia was subsequently joined by groups led by Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk. With none of the parties capable of scoring a decisive victory, the conflict settled into a stalemate characterised by attacks from resistance factions during the rainy season and Vietnamese offensives during the dry season.

After Vietnam invaded Cambodia, Japan joined ASEAN, China and the US in condemning Hanoi’s action and suspending aid to the Vietnamese. A year later, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan heightened tension between the superpowers and increased the gap between Vietnam (which was supported by Moscow) and ASEAN, the US and China. Japan aligned with the Western camp in condemning the Soviet military action but, adhering to the Fukuda Doctrine, continued to work to reduce tension and facilitate dialogue between ASEAN and Vietnam with the ultimate goal of reaching a conflict settlement. In particular, Japan strove to narrow the distance between Vietnam and Thailand, which was directly affected by the crisis in neighbouring Cambodia. Towards this aim, in 1980, Foreign Minister Ōkita Saburō proposed the creation of a demilitarised zone near the Thai-Cambodian border to allow aid to be delivered to refugees (Ajiakyoku chiikiseisakuka 1980). This idea was reiterated the following year by Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao, who also called for a phased Vietnamese withdrawal and the creation of refugee centres in Cambodia (Asahi Shinbun 1981a). These initiatives would reduce the Thai-Vietnamese tension and pressure on Bangkok.

Simultaneously, encouraged by Hanoi’s difficult economic situation and dissatisfaction with Moscow’s assistance, the Japanese continued to engage with Vietnam and to influence its position on the Cambodian problem through diplomatic interaction, humanitarian aid, human exchanges, unofficial bilateral trade and the pledge to support Indochina’s post-conflict reconstruction. This approach contrasted with the confrontational stance of the US (and China), which aimed to isolate Hanoi both diplomatically and economically. An important rationale for Japan’s stance was to oppose the expansion of the Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia and to provide a check on China’s influence in the region, which had been growing as a result of the Cambodian conflict. To balance its ‘member of the West’ status with its policy of engagement with Hanoi, the Japanese followed a twofold diplomatic line: while officially endorsing the Western criticism of the Soviet Union and Vietnam, Tokyo strove to maintain an active diplomatic channel with the Vietnamese to influence their course of action on Cambodia and to prepare for the post-conflict expansion of bilateral relations.

Another aspect of Japan’s diplomacy was that, as early as 1980, the Japanese believed that international support for Pol Pot would decrease because of his negative image resulting from the atrocities committed under his regime, whereas the Phnom Penh government would increasingly consolidate its control
over Cambodia (Nantō-Ajiadaiikka 1980a, 1980b). Consequently, the First Southeast Asia Division, a section of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Asia Bureau that was primarily involved in policy-making with respect to the Cambodian problem, indicated that Tokyo must eventually recognise the Phnom Penh authority as part of an enlarged government that would include the two non-communist factions led by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann (Nantō-Ajiadaiikka 1980a). Under this arrangement, the Japanese expected Sihanouk to play an important role (Yoshida 1980). In the following years, while increasing its distance from the Khmer Rouge, Tokyo strengthened its support of the prince and his negotiations with Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Phnom Penh government.

In 1984 and 1985, Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō announced two proposals. The three-point proposal in 1984 included a Japanese pledge to dispatch personnel to monitor elections in Cambodia and to support financially a peacekeeping operation and post-conflict reconstruction. Subsequently, the four-principle proposal in 1985 mentioned a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, among other things, and called for a dialogue to build confidence among the parties. In 1987, Foreign Minister Kuranari Tadashi presented four key points on which all parties needed to reach consensus to attain peace. In the following year, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru launched the International Cooperation Initiative, which provided a framework for Japan’s involvement in regional conflict resolution (Diplomatic Bluebook 1988a). Takeshita declared that Japan was prepared to participate in UN activities to implement ceasefires, settle conflicts, and contribute to peacekeeping operations not only through financial means but also by dispatching non-military personnel (Diplomatic Bluebook 1988b). According to Kuriyama Takakazu (personal communication, 30 June 2010), then-deputy foreign minister, a role for Japan in the Cambodia peace process was given high consideration when the initiative was formulated. In 1989, Takeshita announced four basic points for settling the Cambodian conflict: a guarantee of the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops under international monitoring and the non-return of the inhumane practices committed during the Pol Pot regime; free elections; an effective monitoring mechanism to guarantee the previous points; and a comprehensive political settlement that preserved the security of Cambodia and neighbouring countries. Japan would contribute funds, personnel and non-military materials for monitoring operations (Gaikō seisho 1989).

During the second half of the 1980s, important developments in Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet relations led to a reduction of international tension. This outcome was reflected in the softening of Washington’s and Beijing’s stances towards Hanoi and in the creation of favourable conditions for solving the Cambodian problem. In this context, Japan sought to enhance its involvement in the peace negotiations. After mentioning some core aspects responsible for Japan’s stance on the Cambodian problem after 1989, the next section examines the line
of continuity between Japanese diplomacy from the beginning of the conflict and Tokyo’s initiatives during the final phase of the peace process.

**Japan’s role in the peace process: the maturation of a decade-long diplomatic effort**

When the peace process entered a mature stage in 1989, Japan played an active role that built on its constructive diplomacy in the previous ten years. The motivations for the Fukuda Doctrine guided Japan during the peace process as it worked to promote the realisation of peaceful coexistence and stability in Southeast Asia while enhancing Japan’s regional role. Vietnam continued to be important to realising the Japanese plan. In June 1989, the First Southeast Asia Division, after emphasising the need to guarantee Thailand’s security, recognised the importance of promoting ‘Vietnam’s pursuit of its independent line and its distancing from the Soviet Union’ (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1989). Japanese policymakers believed that there was ‘a limit to Soviet power of influence on Vietnam’ and expected that if the Vietnamese shifted their resources to building their nation, Vietnam would likely become a leading power in Southeast Asia (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1989, p. 6). Therefore, Tokyo needed to promote its policy towards Vietnam while looking beyond the Cambodian peace process (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1989). In short, Japan continued its engagement policy towards Hanoi; as the First Southeast Asia Division stated, Tokyo had been following this type of policy throughout the Cambodian conflict. Despite suspending its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Vietnamese, Japan had maintained a political dialogue with Hanoi and attempted to convince it to negotiate a conflict settlement (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1988). These considerations, coupled with Japanese attention to guaranteeing Thai security, demonstrate that Tokyo continued the pursuit of its policy of working with the two ASEAN and Indochinese countries that were most involved in the Cambodian problem to promote their rapprochement. Building on the continuity of its diplomatic line and taking advantage of the more favourable international environment, Japan was prepared to enter the formal and global phase of the peace process. The 1989 Paris International Conference on Cambodia, which is discussed in the next section, was the occasion for the realisation of Japan’s entry.

**The Paris conference and Japan’s official return to a role in a peace process**

In September 1979, MOFA’s Asia Bureau indicated that Japan wanted to create an international atmosphere for a peace process in Cambodia (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1979) and to play a major role therein. For this purpose, Tokyo needed to maintain a neutral position in terms of support to the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1979) because backing either party could jeopardise Japan’s capacity to play a diplomatic role in peace efforts. Japan’s
Vietnam policy was considered important to enhancing Tokyo’s involvement in peace negotiations and participating in future international conferences. Foreign Minister Sonoda stated that Japanese efforts in 1979 to maintain an active communication channel with Hanoi were important to strengthening Japan’s role in Asia. As one of the few countries with relations with the Vietnamese, Japan could engage in dialogue with Hanoi, and such a dialogue constituted ‘one instrument through which Japan can play an active political role for Asian stability’ (Sonoda 1980, p. 253). In July 1979, Sonoda proposed an international conference on Cambodia, and in 1984 and 1985, the First Southeast Asia Division reiterated Japan’s commitment to participating in the conflict settlement and set the preparation of ‘Japan’s strategic move toward its future role by participating in an international conference’ as one of its objectives (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1985). In 1987, MOFA repeated its wish for Japan to host a conference with the Cambodian parties and Vietnam as a prelude to ‘Japan’s participation in the international conference that was expected to take place in the future’ (MOFA n.d.). Thus, Japan had long advocated the convening of a conference while striving to create favourable conditions for such a conference to be held.

Hence, Japan’s attendance at the Paris conference in July and August 1989 represented the culmination of previous diplomatic efforts. This move marked a de facto return of Japan to a role in the settlement of a conflict; it was Tokyo’s first time participating in a peace conference in the post-Second World War era. Japan’s appointment as co-chair with Australia of the conference’s Third Committee on refugees and postwar reconstruction amounted to recognition of the role that Tokyo had played with respect to these two issues. Since 1979, the Japanese had covered 50 per cent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) budget for Indochinese refugees, and in 1985 Foreign Minister Abe announced that Japan would continue financing nearly half of the UNHCR budget for Indochina (Gaikō sei sho 1986). With regard to Indochina’s post-conflict reconstruction, in January 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō declared that Japan would support this reconstruction, and Foreign Minister Abe reiterated this pledge in 1984.

Although the conference failed to reach a general agreement among the parties, the outcome for Tokyo was an important diplomatic achievement and enhanced Japan’s standing in international affairs. Imagawa Yukio (personal communication, 6 July 2010), an important Japanese diplomat in the negotiations, stated that the conference was meaningful for Japan ‘to change its diplomatic posture in Southeast Asia’. Indeed, Japan’s participation fostered the expansion of Tokyo’s foreign policy from its focus on economic matters to political and security affairs. As Imagawa (2008, pp. 60, 63) noted, Japan’s role as co-chair of the Third Committee marked the transformation of Tokyo’s diplomacy from passive to active and creative. A decade after the outbreak of the conflict, Japan had finally made its debut in the conference, co-chairing the only committee in which an agreement was concluded. This move increased Tokyo’s confidence and efforts to enhance its role in the negotiations, which are addressed in the following section.
Establishing Japan’s role in the peace process

In its effort to become one of the main players in the peace process, Japan’s strategy was to work closely with Southeast Asian actors while cooperating with the UN. To implement this strategy, Japan needed to establish contacts with the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh. In 1980, the First Southeast Asia Division had already indicated that Japan would eventually need to recognise the Phnom Penh authority as part of an enlarged government that included a ‘third authority’, that is, Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1980a). When a delegation from the Japan-Cambodia Trade Association visited Cambodia in August of that year, the First Southeast Asia Division did not oppose this visit; rather, it stated as follows: ‘keeping in mind the realisation of an ultimate compromise [on the Cambodian problem], we think that this [mission] . . . can contribute to improving the Cambodian economy in the long term’ (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1980a). In September 1981, an LDP delegation that included Diet members and a parliamentary vice minister visited Cambodia and engaged in discussions with officials of the Phnom Penh government (Asahi Shinbun 1981b, 1981c). Such discussions marked the first Japanese official contact with that authority, which Japan did not recognise. In 1985, the First Southeast Asia Division indicated that one expected scenario included recognition of the Phnom Penh government (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1985), and later MOFA mentioned that an option to enhance Japan’s diplomatic position, in addition to public support for Sihanouk, included the establishment of contacts with the Phnom Penh government (MOFA n.d.). Thus, Japan’s strategy was to focus increasingly on Sihanouk and Hun Sen as the key figures in peace negotiations. Indeed, when the two leaders met for a number of rounds of talks beginning in December 1987, Japan enthusiastically supported the initiative. Japan’s attempts to cultivate relations with Vietnam – Phnom Penh’s main supporter – also worked in Tokyo’s favour when it attempted to establish contacts with Hun Sen.

Tanino Sakutarō (personal communication, 7 June 2010), then-deputy director of the Asia Bureau, made the first move and organised a fact-finding mission to Phnom Penh to observe the Cambodian domestic situation (COE 2005). He sent Watanabe Tōru, a former MOFA official who had been working as a researcher at Japan’s embassy in Hanoi after his retirement. Between May and August 1989, Watanabe made three trips to Cambodia, each time reporting to the Asia Bureau and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuriyama (Tanino Sakutarō, personal communication, 7 June 2010; COE 2005). Watanabe emphasised that the Phnom Penh government was stable and recommended that Tokyo give it more importance and improve bilateral relations by granting visas to Cambodian officials to visit Japan (COE 2005). Moreover, Watanabe recommended that Japan dissociate from the Khmer Rouge and gradually pursue normalisation with Phnom Penh (Tanino Sakutarō, personal communication, 7 June 2010). The relative solidity of the Hun Sen government and the lack of significant popular opposition to its
authority favoured Japan’s plan to establish contacts with this government. Another important element was the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989 (Imagawa 2008). The almost simultaneous end of the Cold War influenced the Indochinese situation.

Another motivation for Japan’s decision to establish contacts with the State of Cambodia (SOC), as the Phnom Penh government was called in 1989, was that Japan, which was not a UN Security Council permanent member, needed to find alternative ways to play a part in the settlement. Tokyo decided to follow the strategy of working directly with the Cambodians (COE 2005). Tanino Sakutarō (personal communication, 7 June 2010), director of the Asia Bureau in 1989–1992, revealed that, although Watanabe Tōru’s visits in 1989 were fact-finding trips, the 1990 mission to Cambodia by Kōno Masaharu, director of the First Southeast Asia Division, was aimed primarily at establishing limited relations with Phnom Penh and creating a better perception of the regime’s stability. This strategy contravened that of the Americans, who were maintaining a hard line towards Vietnam and its protégé in Phnom Penh. However, the Asia Bureau was determined to ensure that Japan played an active part in the conflict settlement, for which it was necessary to work with the SOC (COE 2005). Upon being informed by MOFA about the mission, the Americans requested that Kōno not meet Hun Sen or other government officials and that he limit his meetings to the working level that was necessary for fact finding (COE 2005). Imagawa (personal communication, 6 July 2010) revealed that those requests stemmed from US concerns that Japan might recognise the Vietnam-backed government. The requests were also linked to the lack of enthusiasm of the UN Security Council permanent members with regard to the prospect of other countries, such as Japan, Thailand or Indonesia, playing a large role in the settlement.

During his visit to Cambodia, Kōno (1999) met with one minister, a number of vice ministers and other authorities and returned with three major kernels of information: first, the SOC, which controlled the majority of Cambodia, wanted to be independent from Vietnam; second, Phnom Penh claimed that since the mid-1980s it had abandoned its socialist economy in favour of an open economy and that it wanted to introduce a multiparty system in the future; and, third, many Cambodians disliked the Khmer Rouge and opposed its return to power and thus supported Hun Sen (Kōno 1999).

By opening contact with the SOC, Tokyo expanded its access to the key Cambodian players and the scope of its diplomacy with respect to the problem. Less than three months after Kōno’s mission, Imagawa met with Hun Sen in Thailand and explained Japan’s proposal to host a conference in June, which the Cambodian leader agreed to attend (Imagawa 2008). Kōno’s ice-breaking mission to Cambodia contributed to realising the 1990 Tokyo conference in that the establishment of bilateral contacts facilitated Tokyo’s invitation to Hun Sen. The fact that establishing contacts with Phnom Penh contributed to expanding Japan’s diplomatic role could also be observed in April 1991, when the Japanese invited
Hun Sen to Tokyo for medical treatment. MOFA’s secret initiative – Hun Sen was admitted to a hospital under a false name (COE 2005) – of inviting the leader of a country that Japan did not recognise demonstrated Tokyo’s determination to play an active part in the peace process. During the visit, the Japanese attempted to persuade the Cambodian prime minister to cooperate with the UN peace plan. After Hun Sen left the hospital, he conducted talks in Tokyo with Deputy Foreign Minister Owada Hisashi, Tanino, Kôno and Imagawa (COE 2005; Imagawa 2008). One of the issues that Owada raised was Phnom Penh’s refusal to accept the UN Security Council permanent members’ peace proposal’s prescription for the disarmament and demobilisation of all Cambodian parties’ troops; the reason for the refusal was that Hun Sen did not expect the Khmer Rouge to cooperate. Owada strove to convince the Cambodian leader by declaring that Japan would cooperate with him and attempt to ensure that Hun Sen’s concerns would not materialise (COE 2005). Eventually, in August, Hun Sen accepted a plan to disarm and demobilise 70 per cent of his troops. Another step towards the improvement of Tokyo-Phnom Penh relations was the first bilateral high-level meeting held in Ho Chi Minh City in June 1991, when Foreign Minister Nakayama met with Prime Minister Hun Sen. During the meeting, which was strongly desired by Japan (COE 2005), the Cambodian leader showed determination to negotiate a settlement with Sihanouk. According to Kôno, Hun Sen’s attitude was related to his recent visit to Japan (COE 2005).

After the establishment of contacts with Phnom Penh, Japan, relying on its channels with Sihanouk and Hun Sen, had placed itself in a position to play a larger part in the peace process and to enhance its international role. In June 1990, the Japanese hosted a conference in Tokyo among the warring parties; MOFA had been planning this initiative for several years. In December 1980, Japan had indicated its preparedness to host a conference in Tokyo among the Cambodian factions, ASEAN countries and Vietnam (Nantô-Ajia daiikka 1980c). In 1987, Japanese foreign policy-makers considered the idea of hosting a conference in Tokyo with the Cambodian parties and Vietnam (MOFA n.d.), and, in October, the Asia Bureau discussed a proposal for an international conference aimed at strengthening Sihanouk’s role (Ajiakyoku 1987). These ideas culminated in the Tokyo conference in June 1990, which was organised in cooperation with Thailand. In April, during Thai Prime Minister Chatichai’s visit to Japan, Kôno Masaharu met with Chatichai’s advisors and proposed hosting Sihanouk-Hun Sen talks in Tokyo (COE 2005). The Thais welcomed the proposal, and, on 7 April, the two prime ministers agreed to invite the two Cambodian leaders to hold talks in Japan (Ikeda 1998). However, Prince Sihanouk’s initial reaction was negative. Ikeda Tadashi, a diplomat at Japan’s embassy in Bangkok, travelled along the Thai-Cambodian border to meet Sihanouk and deliver a message from Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki to explain the proposal. For Sihanouk, it was necessary to invite the Khmer Rouge to the conference; otherwise, they would not have recognised any agreement that was reached there (Ikeda 1998). On 21 May,
Ikeda and Imagawa visited Sihanouk again. During this visit, the prince accepted the invitation to attend the conference and stated that Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge would also attend (Ikeda 1998). Thus, Japan’s channels with Sihanouk and Hun Sen facilitated the realisation of this diplomatic initiative.

In early June of 1990, the conference was convened in Tokyo with the participation of the four Cambodian parties. Japan’s diplomatic skills were tested when it needed to cope with the Khmer Rouge’s decision to boycott the event, but Japan decided to proceed by issuing a final communiqué signed only by Hun Sen and Sihanouk. The document declared the establishment of the Supreme National Council as the transitional Cambodian authority and its composition of twelve members, including half from the SOC and two from each of the three resistance factions. This result was important because power sharing in a transitional authority had been a long-debated issue. Although only two of four Cambodian leaders signed the communiqué, the conference was a diplomatic achievement for Japan. In addition to the agreement reached by Hun Sen and Sihanouk, the conference shed light on Japan’s diplomatic role: Tokyo persuaded Sihanouk to attend the event, attempted (although unsuccessfully) to convince the Khmer Rouge to end its boycott and decided to issue the final communiqué signed by only two Cambodian parties. Moreover, hosting a conference that included Hun Sen, the leader of a country that Japan did not recognise, was a bold move because it implied that recognition of Cambodia was a fait accompli.

After peace agreements were signed in Paris in October 1991, the post-conflict reconstruction of Cambodia was another area in which Japan made a significant contribution. In his January 1981 speech in Bangkok, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō pledged to support Indochina’s reconstruction after peace was attained. This pledge was reaffirmed on several occasions, including by Foreign Minister Abe in July 1984. After the Paris peace agreements, Japan implemented its promise and assumed the lead in organising a conference in Tokyo on 20–22 June 1992, an international Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. A total of US$ 880 million of aid was pledged, with Japan offering US$ 150–200 million (Ikeda 1998). The conference established an International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia to coordinate assistance for reconstruction, and Japan was appointed as its chair. Overall, the Japanese diplomatic initiatives assisted Tokyo in pursuit of its Southeast Asian policy and provided a foundation for its post-Cold War regional role. The relationship among Japan’s diplomatic initiatives, its Southeast Asian policy and its post-Cold War regional role is discussed in the next section.

The Cambodian peace process, the Fukuda Doctrine and the expansion of Japan’s post-Cold War regional role

The idea of promoting peaceful coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina continued to be a primary goal during the final stage of the peace process. It
is important to observe that, during this phase, key foreign policy-making positions were assigned to persons who had been involved in the formulation of the doctrine or some of the ideas behind the doctrine. In June 1989, Tanino Sakutarō became director general of the Asia Bureau. He was one of the contributors to the Manila speech and, in early 1987, began work on the Cambodian problem. Tanino (personal communication, 7 June 2010) stated that those involved in Japanese policy-making on Cambodia in the late 1980s had very clear in their minds the realisation of the vision announced by Fukuda in 1977. In August 1989, Ōwada Hisashi became deputy foreign minister. He had served as private secretary to Prime Minister Fukuda and was considered a central figure in the formulation of the Manila speech. In the same month, Nakayama Tarō was appointed foreign minister. Within the LDP, Nakayama had factional links with Fukuda Takeo and, in the mid-1970s, had participated in a study group under Fukuda that outlined some of the ideas forming the basis of what eventually became Japan’s Southeast Asia policy (Fukuda 1976). The appointment of these people to important positions in the Japanese diplomatic corps provided continuity to the principles and objectives of Japan’s regional policy.

During the peace process, another line of continuity with Japan’s regional strategy was Tokyo’s adherence to its long-held stance of engaging the Vietnamese. In June 1989, the First Southeast Asia Division indicated that supporting Vietnam’s pursuit of its independent line and ensuring distance from Moscow remained a basic aspect of Japan’s policy (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1989). Supporting Vietnam’s ‘neutralisation’ to prevent eventual Soviet or Chinese influence had been an important element of Japan’s Southeast Asia policy since the 1970s and motivated the Asia Bureau to continue engaging with Hanoi even during the Cambodian conflict and the heightened Cold War tension following the invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore, Japanese efforts to solve the Cambodian conflict were also aimed at rehabilitating Vietnam and supporting its development (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1989).

Foreign Minister Nakayama’s visit to Vietnam in June 1991 reflected improvements in bilateral relations, fostered by Hanoi’s complete withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. However, US opposition to the resumption of international and Japanese aid to Hanoi hampered the expansion of Japan-Vietnam relations. In September 1989, Washington voiced objection to assistance to Vietnam by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other financial institutions (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1992). However, Japan stated that it would not oppose IMF aid. The US requested that Tokyo reconsider its position and claimed that Japan’s unilateral improvement of relations with Hanoi would create a ‘real strain’ on US-Japan relations (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1992). However, after the 1991 Paris peace agreements, Tokyo’s eagerness to resume ODA increased. The Americans asked Tanino (personal communication, 7 June 2010) to wait until the US presidential campaign ended, given that Vietnam was a highly sensitive domestic political issue. In October, Japanese officials informed their American counterparts that Japan would
commence negotiations with the Vietnamese because supporting the liberalisation of Vietnam’s economy could help integrate Hanoi into regional cooperation (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1992).

Vietnam’s geopolitical role in the Southeast Asian balance of power continued to be a factor motivating Japan’s stance. In October 1991, the Japanese informed the Americans that the lack of a US medium- to long-term policy with respect to Indochina would facilitate the creation of a regional power vacuum that would be filled by China following the Soviet disappearance from the region. Such an outcome would increase Beijing’s influence and create instability (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1992). The Japanese added that, because Soviet aid to Vietnam had ended, the Vietnamese would need to strengthen relations with China if the West did not support Hanoi; however, such relations would hamper economic reforms in Vietnam and lead to the return of conservatives to power (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1992).

The appointment of Watanabe Michio as foreign minister in November 1991 reinvigorated Japanese efforts. He was an advocate of Japan-Vietnam relations and actively sought to improve them (Tanino Sakutarō, personal communication, 7 June 2010) and to work for a Cambodian settlement to expand the bilateral relationship (Kōno Masaharu, personal communication, 8 May 2012). During the same month, Watanabe met US Secretary of State James Baker, who requested that Tokyo consult with Washington on its ODA to Vietnam ‘to ensure that Japan did not get too far out in front of the US’. Watanabe emphasised that ‘the US and Japan had quite different perspectives on Vietnam’ and that, because the Cambodian problem had been settled, Japan could not continue to punish the Vietnamese by denying aid (DNSA 1991, pp. 9–10). Although Japan acquiesced to American requests to postpone the resumption of aid to Hanoi, it continued to lobby the US to change its approach towards Vietnam. Eventually, in November 1992, Japan resumed ODA, which facilitated the expansion of bilateral relations.

While engaging with Vietnam, Japan furthered its diplomatic cooperation with Thailand with respect to the Cambodian question. Thus, Japan continued its long-held approach of providing special attention to Hanoi and Bangkok, reflecting efforts to work with Indochina and ASEAN to reduce their distance with respect to the Cambodian problem. The Japanese had been pursuing this approach since Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. As discussed above, the Japanese made bridging efforts to reduce Thai-Vietnamese tension, such as a proposal for the creation of demilitarised zones, a phased Vietnamese withdrawal, the realisation of refugee centres in Cambodia and encouragement of Thai-Vietnamese dialogue. Japan’s financial and political support to Thailand, which was directly affected by the destabilising effects of the conflict, assisted in building bilateral trust. In January 1979, Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi offered Bangkok aid to cope with the Indochinese refugee crisis. Between 1980 and 1986, Thailand became the main recipient of Japanese grant aid, and in June 1989 the First Southeast Asia Division indicated that guaranteeing Thai security was a basic aspect of Tokyo’s policy on the Cambodian issue (Nantō-Ajia daiikka 1989).
During the final part of the peace process, Japan and Thailand cooperated in conducting diplomatic initiatives. According to Kōno Masaharu (personal communication, 8 May 2012), Thailand wanted to expand its economic influence in the region, including in Cambodia. Hence, Prime Minister Chatichai wanted to settle the Cambodian conflict quickly. Kōno revealed that the Thais needed a partner to engage in diplomatic initiatives, and Japan was considered an appropriate partner for this purpose. Indeed, the two countries had similar ideas with regard to the Cambodian question (Kōno Masaharu, personal communication, 8 May 2012). In fact, both Tokyo and Bangkok paid considerable attention to Phnom Penh’s role in the settlement. Kōno developed the idea of cooperating with the Thais after his 1990 mission to Cambodia. During this visit, he noticed that Hun Sen controlled nearly 90 per cent of the territory, which would be discordant with only a 25 per cent share of the power in a future Cambodian transitional coalition government. Consequently, the Japanese pursued a two-party solution (Kōno Masaharu, personal communication, 8 May 2012): a power-sharing framework of 50 per cent for the Phnom Penh government, with the remaining 50 per cent divided among the three resistance groups, rather than 25 per cent for each of the four Cambodian parties. Kōno (personal communication, 8 May 2012) knew that some of Chatichai’s advisers had close relations with Hun Sen’s regime and thought that ‘it may be a wise idea to take advantage of our connection with Chatichai to use their [the Thais’] personal relationship with Hun Sen’. Thai-Japanese cooperation materialised with the 1990 Tokyo conference and efforts in 1992 to persuade the Khmer Rouge to respect the Paris peace agreements (discussed in the next section).

Given the sensitivity of a regional political role for Tokyo, cooperation with a Southeast Asian partner such as Thailand ensured that Japan did not operate in isolation. Another issue was that the Cambodian conflict had strengthened the Thais’ relations with China, causing concern within ASEAN that this situation could favour an excessive expansion of Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia. Kōno (personal communication, 8 May 2012) stated that ‘the weak point of Thailand was China’ at the time of the peace process; the Thais ‘could never take any initiative without the silent recognition by the Chinese’. Japanese attention to Thailand throughout the Cambodian conflict also generally served to counterbalance an excessive Thai tilt towards Beijing. In sum, during the final phase of the peace process, Tokyo used its positive relationship with Bangkok in efforts to enhance its role in the conflict settlement. In this context, Japan’s involvement to create and maintain peace during the last two years of the Cambodian settlement (discussed in the next section) further assisted Tokyo in shaping its role in Southeast Asia after the end of the Cold War.

Peacemaking, peacekeeping and the expansion of the Fukuda Doctrine

Guided by their long-held approach of working with Southeast Asian actors to reduce the distance among them and by becoming involved in peacemaking and
peacekeeping in Cambodia, the Japanese expanded their role in regional political and security affairs. Beginning in July 1992, Japan practised diplomatic intervention to remove threats to the peace plan that was intended to address the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to demobilise their troops. During that month, a UN Security Council resolution condemned the Khmer Rouge for impeding the access of UN personnel to the Khmer Rouge-controlled areas, hence obstructing the implementation of the peace plan. Japan and Thailand attempted to convince the group to abide by the peace agreements, with joint Thai-Japanese efforts implemented in Bangkok and Phnom Penh on four occasions between July and October 1992. The Japanese delegation was led by Tanino Sakutarō at the first meeting and by Ikeda Tadashi on the following three occasions. Vice Foreign Minister Owada was also involved, with Prime Minister Miyazawa and Foreign Minister Watanabe following the negotiations (Ikeda 1998). Ultimately, these efforts were not successful, and the Khmer Rouge continued to obstruct the peace process. Nevertheless, Thai-Japanese attempts were praised in two UN Security Council resolutions in October and November, in which the two governments were invited to continue their diplomatic effort. For Japan, the resolutions offered an important recognition of its peacemaking role and a realisation of its long-held ambition to be an active player in the process. Tokyo’s pragmatic approach during the years of preserving contacts with the increasingly abhorred Khmer Rouge also favoured this initiative.

The unprecedented participation of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia) was a major event in the process of internationalising Japan’s role. By sending personnel to the field, Japan expanded its involvement beyond financial and diplomatic contributions to peace. The 1991 Paris peace agreements established a UN peacekeeping operation under which the peace plan could be implemented. The appointment of Akashi Yasushi, a Japanese diplomat, as head of the UN mission was significant in the context of Japan’s efforts to enhance its international stature. As early as July 1984, Foreign Minister Abe had indicated Japan’s willingness to expand its contribution to UN peace activities beyond economic support, announcing that Tokyo was prepared to dispatch non-military personnel to monitor elections in Cambodia. In 1988, Japan further increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations with Prime Minister Takeshita’s International Cooperation Initiative. The Gulf War in 1990 and the criticism of Tokyo for not dispatching troops to join the international coalition fighting in Iraq generated a domestic debate on the feasibility of sending SDF troops to peacekeeping missions. As a result, in June 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted to permit SDF participation in the UN peacekeeping operations. In September, the first SDF peacekeepers arrived in Cambodia. Under UN supervision, despite the Khmer Rouge’s boycott, general elections were held successfully in May 1993, with a turnout of approximately 90 per cent of the voters. A new constitution was promulgated in September,
and Sihanouk became king of Cambodia while Hun Sen and Prince Ranarridh (Sihanouk’s son) became co-prime ministers in the new Cambodian government. The SDF dispatch to UNTAC represented an expansion of the Fukuda Doctrine, in that Japan went beyond economic and diplomatic means to pursue regional stability and peaceful relations between ASEAN and Indochina. Cambodia, as well as Southeast Asia in general, provided Japan with the opportunity to enhance its regional and global political stature. This idea was encompassed in the 1977 Manila speech and had been part of the Asia Bureau’s formulation since the 1970s, when Southeast Asia’s importance in Japan’s effort to strengthen its international role was clarified (Ajiakyoku 1976). According to Owada Hisashi (personal communication, 5 September 2010), the main reason for sending the SDF to Cambodia as their initial mission was linked to two pillars of Japanese foreign policy: cooperation for and with Asian countries and Japan’s desire to play ‘a constructive role in a global context’. These two pillars had to be linked and, by dispatching the SDF to UNTAC, Japan could achieve this purpose. Therefore, the role that Japan played was not merely regional; ‘it was part of a global role but focusing on the region’ (Owada Hisashi, personal communication, 5 September 2010).

This statement helps to clarify the link between the Fukuda Doctrine and Japan’s participation in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia. Through its persistent adherence to the doctrine throughout the Cambodian conflict, Japan had been fulfilling its regional and global responsibility as an Asian country and as a member of the world community. This aspiration was one of several objectives included in the Manila speech. The SDF’s participation in UNTAC also contributed to realising the ‘three principles of Japanese foreign policy’ proposed in 1957, as Japan cooperated with the UN in its desire to promote the Free World values of democracy and a free market while working closely with Asian partners and parties to the conflict. As examined in the following section, another outcome of Japan’s involvement in Cambodia was Tokyo’s increased confidence in its political and security role in post-Cold War Southeast Asia.

**Japan’s Cambodia diplomacy and Tokyo’s post-Cold War regional role**

In the early 1990s, after more than ten years of cooperation with ASEAN on the Cambodian problem and diplomatic efforts with respect to Vietnam, Japan exhibited more confidence in its regional role. Building on its relations with ASEAN and Indochinese countries, Japan attempted to increase regional cooperation and stability as a means of coping with the international structural changes prompted by the end of the Cold War. In a May 1991 speech in Singapore, Prime Minister Kaifu addressed the issue of how to position the region in the post-Cold War international order. Considering the existence of unresolved regional conflicts that threatened peace and stability, Kaifu underlined the need to expand cooperation beyond the economic dimension to the political sphere. Kaifu announced Japan’s
readiness to assume a leading role in implementing this goal (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991a) by building on its experience gained, for instance, in handling the Cambodian conflict. Kaifu’s rather direct reference to Japan’s ambition to becoming a major regional player in political affairs was reflected in his assurance that Japan would not play a military role in the region (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991a). There were links between Kaifu’s points and the policy that Japan had been following in Southeast Asia. He emphasised the importance of restoring peace in Cambodia as necessary to expand ASEAN-Indochina cooperation while pledging Japan’s support to that objective. Kaifu then reaffirmed ASEAN’s centrality in Tokyo’s regional policy and stated that Japan and ASEAN needed to build on their mature partnership to realise peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991a). Therefore, by building on Tokyo’s established role in the economic field and its new role in the political arena, Japan was positioning itself as the promoter of enhanced regional interdependence. As outlined in Kaifu’s speech, Japan’s involvement in the Cambodian settlement contributed to enhancing Tokyo’s political role and confidence in promoting a post-Cold War regional order based on stability and prosperity.

At the July 1991 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Kuala Lumpur, Foreign Minister Nakayama gave a speech that followed up on Kaifu’s statements. Nakayama emphasised the importance of deepening political dialogue in the region to increase mutual trust. Towards that aim, he proposed establishing a meeting of senior officials who would report to the ASEAN PMC (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991b). As Nakayama noted, this initiative was also linked to the need to ensure that Japan’s increased political role did not create anxiety in the region. For this purpose, it was necessary for Japanese political initiatives to be part of a process of ‘political dialogue designed to increase the sense of security felt by all parties’ (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991b). The initial reactions of ASEAN countries to the proposal were cautious, reflecting their reluctance to place excessive emphasis on security issues in their discussions with dialogue partners. However, Japan’s expression of willingness to be more involved in Southeast Asian political and security matters did not generate criticism, and the Japanese proposal was not rejected. In January 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa gave a speech in Bangkok reiterating the Japanese line. When discussing the contribution of Japan-ASEAN cooperation to post-Cold War regional stability and development, Miyazawa first emphasised the importance of expanding regional political and security dialogue. Following up on Nakayama’s proposal, Miyazawa emphasised the ASEAN PMC’s role in fostering such a dialogue and voiced Japan’s willingness to actively contribute to it (DASIS 1993).

Nakayama’s proposal reflected Japan’s increased confidence in playing a regional political role. Given that Japan had not yet participated in UNTAC when Nakayama delivered the speech, Tokyo’s diplomatic role in Cambodia likely played an important role in strengthening Tokyo’s confidence. Indeed, similar to Kaifu in his Singapore speech, before making his proposal, Nakayama
described increased Japanese political efforts to address conflicts such as those in Cambodia. Moreover, when referring to Japanese endeavours to facilitate the 1990 Tokyo conference on Cambodia, Nakayama stated that ‘playing a more active political role . . . has taken on an increased importance recently as another major pillar in our diplomatic efforts for ensuring regional stability’ (Diplomatic Bluebook 1991b). Hence, Japan’s Southeast Asia and Cambodia diplomacy was an instrument by which Tokyo could expand its profile in international affairs, consistent with the intentions of the formulaters of Japan’s Southeast Asia strategy in the 1970s.

In both the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur speeches, the expressions of Japan’s determination to play a role in regional political and security affairs were unprecedentedly clear affirmations of Tokyo’s ambitions. Japan’s enhanced confidence was reflected in its decision to present these statements in a region in which memories of past suffering provoked by the Japanese army continued to exist. Because the two speeches were given in the middle of the Cambodian peace process, Japan’s diplomacy during the Cambodian settlement crucially contributed to strengthening Tokyo’s determination to expand the scope of its regional foreign policy.

Nearly fifteen years after the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, the primary obstacles to the realisation of peaceful and cooperative coexistence in Southeast Asia were removed. During the second half of the 1990s, Indochinese countries became members of ASEAN. The Soviet threat had disappeared, and a more stable and integrated Southeast Asia had been realised. Also owing to Japanese initiatives, the 1993 establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum expanded regional interactions to include security issues. In 1992, Japan resumed ODA to Hanoi, and in January 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa followed up on Tokyo’s long-held pledge of contributing to the reconstruction of Indochina by proposing the establishment of a ‘Forum for the Comprehensive Development of Indochina’ and expressing Japan’s readiness to host its international preparatory meeting (DASIS 1993). Through its diplomatic efforts to restore peace in Cambodia, Japan had strengthened its legitimacy with respect to its role in shaping the post-Cold War regional order. As Prime Minister Miyazawa stated in Bangkok in January 1993, once peace had returned in Cambodia, the realisation of cooperative and peaceful coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina could finally become possible. Miyazawa noted that this objective was part of Prime Minister Fukuda’s Manila speech and had ‘consistently been the goal’ of Japan’s regional policy since 1977 (DASIS 1993). Indeed, this goal had motivated Japanese regional diplomacy and provided Japan with a basis on which to build its post-Cold War regional role.

**Conclusion**

In contrast with claims in the existing literature that Japan’s involvement in the peace process began in the late 1980s, the evidence presented in this study shows
that an important factor explaining Tokyo’s active role during the last part of the Cambodian peace settlement was that this involvement built on a diplomatic platform that the Japanese had constructed through their peace efforts since the conflict began. In fact, the policy framework, objectives and initiatives of Japan’s Cambodia diplomacy after 1989 represented the continuation of diplomatic endeavours that had been implemented from 1979. These endeavours were part of Japan’s strategy to pursue its geopolitical and security objectives and political ambitions linked to Southeast Asia, which were at the basis of the Fukuda Doctrine. Therefore, rather than reacting to external events and pressure to play a role in solving the Cambodian problem, Japan actively pursued its own approach to settling the conflict as part of its goal of realising a stable and integrated Southeast Asia that was free from the influence of major powers and in which Japan could maintain an influential position. When international political changes from the late 1980s created favourable conditions in which to realise initiatives and ideas with respect to the Cambodian problem that Japan had been pursuing, Tokyo strove to establish a role in peace negotiations by using its channels with ASEAN and Indochinese parties while cooperating with the UN. This effort was consistent with Japan’s long-held position, based on Prime Minister Fukuda’s 1977 speech, of working with regional actors to reduce tension among them and to establish peaceful coexistence. Japanese relations with Thailand and Vietnam, which Tokyo had cultivated since the beginning of the conflict, favoured Japan’s diplomatic attempts during the peace process. Similarly, Japan worked to facilitate the role of Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen in the negotiations. This Japanese stance diverged from that of the US: Washington advocated a settlement based on a UN role and on the central figure of Sihanouk, whereas the Japanese, working together with the Thais, ‘wanted to build the UN settlement around Hun Sen’ (Richard H. Solomon, personal communication, 2 March 2012). Japan’s approach provided Tokyo with omnidirectional diplomatic channels with several parties involved in the conflict, and these channels proved useful for implementing Japanese diplomatic initiatives during the peace negotiations.

International pressure on Japan to share more of the burden of international affairs, the role of individual Japanese MOFA officials and diplomats and the more favourable international environment (although representing elements that contributed to the Japanese role to various extents) were not determinant factors in explaining Japan’s diplomacy during the peace process after 1989. Indeed, the relaxation of the Cold War tension during the second half of the 1980s facilitated Japan’s active contribution to the peace process. However, the dissipation of this tension was neither decisive in triggering the Japanese involvement nor sufficient to explain it. In fact, as this article has sought to demonstrate, the Japanese had been working since 1979 to play a role in the process that was consistent with Tokyo’s determination, especially within MOFA, to pursue its own strategy in Southeast Asia.
The fact that MOFA – and particularly the Asia Bureau, which had also been central in the formulation of the third pillar of the Fukuda Doctrine – continued to have a major role in foreign policy-making with respect to the Cambodian problem facilitated the continuance of Japan’s regional policy and its reflection in Tokyo’s role during the peace process. MOFA’s commitment (coupled with the role of certain Japanese politicians who had an interest in settling the conflict) to enhancing Japan’s international stature acted as a driving force for Tokyo’s efforts to positively and visibly contribute to the Cambodian settlement even without being a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Japanese diplomatic initiatives and the SDF participation in UNTAC contributed to strengthening Japan’s confidence in its ability to play a political role in fostering cooperation in Southeast Asia on political and security affairs. This increased confidence was reflected in Japan’s explicit expression of willingness in 1991 to act as a promoter of regional political and security dialogue. These Japanese initiatives were not opposed by ASEAN countries, despite the involvement of a political role for Japan in security affairs in a region in which the legacy of Japanese deeds during the Second World War still lingered. Therefore, through the Cambodian conflict, guided by the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan enhanced its regional role, expanded the scope of its foreign policy beyond the economic dimension to the political and security arenas, and placed itself in a more solid position to play a role in shaping the post-Cold War order in Southeast Asia.

Prime Minister Takeshita’s International Cooperation Initiative facilitated Japan’s peacemaking and peacekeeping contributions to the peace process. This initiative complemented the idea behind the 1977 Manila speech of fostering Japan’s role as a non-military economic power seeking to contribute to international peace and stability. Indeed, through its involvement in Cambodia, Japan expanded its peacemaking, peacekeeping and diplomatic role, which was important for enhancing Tokyo’s post-Cold War international stature. Director Kono (personal communication, 8 May 2012) of the First Southeast Asia Division revealed that a ‘hidden agenda’ during the peace process was that Cambodia represented ‘the most appropriate case study for us’ because Japan would play a more proactive and constructive role in future peace efforts.

During the war in Cambodia, Japan acted to protect its plan to establish a position of influence in Southeast Asia that was being challenged by the Soviet Union. After the Vietnam War, taking advantage of the Cambodian conflict, China sought to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. However, although Sino-Japanese relations had been improving, especially after the 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Japan viewed Beijing as a competitor in that region. In this context, Tokyo’s strategy of creating peaceful coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina represented a way to reduce the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence. This Japanese effort continued to represent an important aspect of Tokyo’s Southeast Asia policy in the post-Cold War period in terms of addressing
the Chinese role in the region. In this sense, the study of the Cambodian case is important to understanding Japan’s behaviour in Southeast Asia in the years following the end of the Cambodian conflict. In particular, China’s increasingly assertive posture in that region, such as in the South China Sea, has posed a threat to Tokyo’s interests. This situation shares certain similarities with the threat represented by the Soviet military presence in that part of Southeast Asia during the Cambodian conflict. Japan’s approach of addressing current threats to regional stability by strengthening relations and cooperation with ASEAN countries shows that the principles announced by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1977 remain a valid basis for Japanese diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

Finally, this study does not claim that Japan was the key player in settling the Cambodian conflict. The resumption of peace was the result of efforts by several actors facilitated by an international political environment with reduced tension. Nevertheless, Japan was one of those actors and, after 1979, actively and constructively attempted to influence the course of events in Cambodia. The restoration of peace in the country by 1993 facilitated the realisation of stability and coexistence in Southeast Asia, which was symbolised by the accession of Indochinese countries into ASEAN by 1999. The significance of the Fukuda Doctrine was that it represented the strategic framework by which Japan assisted in shaping Southeast Asia’s order, initially during the post-Vietnam War period and subsequently during the initial phases of the post-Cold War era.

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Notes

1. All quotations from Japanese-language sources have been translated into English by the author.
2. Kent E. Calder (1988) described Japan as a reactive state, that is, a state that, rather than initiating independent foreign policy initiatives (even if they have the necessary capability and incentives to do so), reacts to external pressure ‘erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely’. On the debate on the nature of Japan’s foreign policy, see, for example, Miyashita and Sato (2001).

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