Hybrid diaspora and identity-laundering: a study of the return overseas Chinese Vietnamese in Vietnam

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Among the overseas Vietnamese around the world, many are Chinese Vietnamese. They fled from Vietnam for different political and economic reasons during the 1970s and the 1980s. Many of them have returned to Vietnam since the 1990s to work, invest or retire. What is interesting about these returned Chinese Vietnamese migrants is the fact that when they left Vietnam they were called by the Vietnamese the Hoa (華, Chinese) or Hoa kiều (華僑, overseas Chinese) by the Vietnamese. This identity was actually one of the reasons for their escape. When they returned, they were lumped together with all other returnees into the category of Việt kiều (越僑, overseas Vietnamese) and enjoyed the special rights offered by the Việt kiều policy of the Vietnamese government, which was aimed at boosting the national economy. Although their ‘Chinese’ identity had once made them to risk their lives by sailing out on the roaring sea, their ‘Vietnamese’ identity brought them back to Vietnam at other turning points in their lives. The shifting identity of these Hoa kiều-turned-Việt kiều has produced an interesting migration story and an intriguing category of ‘hybrid diaspora.’

Keywords: hybrid diaspora; Chinese/Vietnamese diaspora; identity-scape; identity-laundering

Introduction

Since the Vietnamese government implemented the Đổi mới (renovation) policy in 1986, the number of overseas Vietnamese returning to Vietnam for visit, work, investment and retirement has been increasing. The Vietnamese government has issued different favourable polices since the 2000s to attract more investment and professional resources from within the overseas Vietnamese communities. These include allowing overseas Vietnamese to register directly for business, purchase houses and obtain 5-year visa-free entry permits. Among the returnees, many are ethnic Chinese, as there were many Chinese Vietnamese in the Vietnamese refugee diaspora from Vietnam during the 1970s and the 1980s. This is what Ramses Amer calls the ‘ethnic Chinese dimension’ of the boat people crisis, which will be discussed in detail later. Besides the boat people, this article will also shed light on a less-reported Chinese Vietnamese migrant group who left Vietnam before the fall of Saigon. A lot of these migrants were young men who sailed from Vietnam to Hong Kong by hiding inside the cargo cabins of big ships. A common reason for them to sneak away was to avoid the military draft of the South Vietnamese government.

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What is interesting about the Chinese Vietnamese migrants is the fact that when they left Vietnam in the 1970s and the 1980s, they were called Hoa kiều (overseas Chinese) or Hoa (Chinese) in Vietnam, but when they returned to Vietnam in the last two decades, they were recognised as Việt kiều (overseas Vietnamese). These different labels denote both life opportunities and sufferings at different periods. While the term Hoa kiều has now been largely abandoned (although it may still carry some stigmatised connotation in Vietnam), Việt kiều has become an ‘acceptable’ and ‘fashionable’ term for all the Vietnamese who migrated and resided overseas. Regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, upon their return, they are all considered as returning Việt kiều. During an interview on the street of Hang Buom in the old quarter of Hanoi with a Chinese Vietnamese man who was born in Hanoi and has lived there till today, I could sense a thin trace of satirical jealousy in his voice:

These few streets were full of Chinese before … in 1979, all others had gone. In the past, many Chinese families sold roast duck meat here, but only my family was left behind after 1979… in 1979, all Chinese people ran away…. Yes, many of my friends returned to visit from different places in the world. Some came back from Britain, some from Hong Kong, also some from Canada … we were all happy seeing each other. We spoke in Chinese, sometimes Vietnamese … But they are all already Việt kiều, and I am still a Hoa kiều!

The shifting of identities of the refugee migrants from Hoa or Hoa kiều to Việt kiều is a fascinating analytical, as well as empirical, subject. The return has been made possible by the national policy of Vietnam towards overseas Vietnamese, within the wider context of the enormous transformation of the political economy of various parts of Asia. This article examines this shifting identity-scape of a particular group of Chinese Vietnamese migrants and their hybrid diasporic experiences.

**Hybrid diaspora and identity-laundering**

Since the 1990s, scholarly interest has been growing in the study of global diasporas in parallel to the prospering transnationalism studies. While transnationalism can be defined as ‘the flow of people, ideas, goods, and capital across national territories’, diaspora ‘refers specially to the movement – forced or voluntary – of people from one or more nation-states to another’. Although the term ‘diaspora’ was originally connected to the Jewish exile and dispersive movements, it is now applied to all migrant groups and does not necessarily convey the previous negative connotations. Diaspora studies have mainly considered diaspora in terms of a single ethnic-based group. However, many migrant groups have moved many times, and their ‘original’ home countries might not be that of their earlier ancestors.

As mentioned, the Chinese dimension of the Vietnamese refugee saga is understudied. The identity of this particular group will not be complete by merely including them either in the Chinese diaspora or in the Vietnamese diaspora. Their return to Vietnam as ‘overseas Vietnamese’ has made their identity intriguing. Before returning to Vietnam, some persons mentioned in this article had actually gone to China briefly for work, and in China they were considered ‘overseas Chinese’.

The term ‘hybrid diaspora’ has been used by others to refer to the experiences of the black diaspora in the Americas. Chivallon studied the multitude of peoples and their social experiences in the black world of the Americas and stresses the hybridity principles in terms of cultural reproduction of a diaspora. Gilroy has also studied the hybrid identities
in the black diaspora. He uses the term ‘Black Atlantic’\(^6\) to cover the diverse forms of identity and common experience of powerlessness among the blacks in Britain, America, Africa and the Caribbean. To him, a diaspora often involves ‘creolized, syncretized, and hybridized and chronically impure culture forms’.\(^7\) I do not use ‘hybrid diaspora’ to refer merely to the hybrid identities and cultural process within a diaspora. With the ethnographic cases and narratives below, I aim to unravel the intriguing complexity of the identity of a particular diasporic group. I attempt to use the term to frame the ongoing movement and shifting identity-scape of a diaspora whose identity and sense of belonging have continued to evolve along with its experiences of ongoing movement. The identity-scape of the ethnographic subjects in this study involves terms like Chinese, Vietnamese, overseas Chinese, overseas Vietnamese – while in reality they are all holding passports from elsewhere, such as Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, the United States, France and Canada. This continuous movement and shifting identity-scape has not only been facilitated by changing national policies, but also by the wider context of changing regional and global political economies.

The return migration of the overseas Chinese Vietnamese, like that of other overseas Vietnamese, has been encouraged by the favourable Viếtkiều policy of the Vietnamese state. As stressed by Chan and Tran,\(^8\) along with the swiftly recycled migrations and dynamic diasporas, it is not only the migrants’ identities that have been changed, the migrant-sending countries and societies are also rapidly changing their attitudes towards the migrants.

A few decades ago, the Chinese were seen as a ‘problematic’ population by the Vietnamese government. Many fled from the internal political turmoil, which particularly affected the ethnic Chinese in the late 1970s. Since the 1990s, they have been ‘welcomed’ back to Vietnam and have become part of the Viếtkiều (Vietnamese compatriots). A return from outside has allowed them to subtly turn from ‘Chinese’ to ‘Vietnamese’, from Hoa kiều to Viếtkiều. Although there are both pragmatic and affective dimensions of the Chinese Vietnamese return to Vietnam, the use of the identity Viếtkiều has definitely brought them much convenience in business and work.

Multiple and recycled migrations of many migrated groups have made diaspora studies receive increasing attention in the field of migration studies. Although return migration is not a new subject,\(^9\) such recycled forms of migration, together with other circular/repeated migrations, have been drawing increasing attention.\(^10\) Today, many migrants may engage in multiple migrations during their lifetimes; their identities can be seen as part of a complex whole involving different geographical places, imaginations of homes, multifold mobilities and a shifting sense of belonging, at different life stages. Their life experiences are certainly more complex than any single ethnic-based label of a diaspora can represent.

Anthropologists have long stressed the ever-shifting processes of culture and identity. Equal attention should also be given to the shifting national and international political economic situations that the ethnographic subjects encounter and live within. Such conditions actually help shape or facilitate the easy or hard shifts of the identity-scape. Elsewhere I have stressed that the issue of identity, whether fluid or static, has to be put under the lenses of both macro political-economic constraints and those of individual micro-environments.\(^11\) Such an outcome of identification is often the result of a dialectical wrestling (between possibilities and constraints) of life choices within specific politico-historical realities. ‘Different historical periods may allow different levels of rigidity or elasticity for people to pick up (as survival strategy) or abandon (because of the taboo involved) certain identity affiliations.’\(^12\) Moreover, in the age of globalization and
migration, domestic and national policies have often had their impacts felt on a global scale and have influenced global governance. Indeed, the rising waves of return and recycling migration in Asia have a lot to do with changing national policies in, and the geopolitical shifts of production bases among, different places in Asia, as well as capital inflows and outflows in Asia and beyond.

The Chinese Vietnamese who left Vietnam during the late 1970s and early 1980s probably did not foresee that they would return to Vietnam in such a short time. The forced migration and voluntary return have been results of the enormous changes of political and economic contexts in Asia and elsewhere. The concept of ‘identity laundering’ may sound a bit provocative, but it aptly conveys the idea of how a once negatively labelled minority from Vietnam has returned as ‘economic heroes’ whose stigmatised identity has been ‘washed’ and given a new label of Việt kiều or kiều bào as a result of their return movement following earlier exiles or escapes.

To distinguish themselves from other Việt kiều, the Chinese Việt kiều call themselves Việt kiều gốc Hoa or Việt kiều người Hoa (overseas Vietnamese of Chinese origin or overseas Vietnamese of Chinese ethnicity). This article situates the unit of study, the Việt kiều gốc Hoa, within the historical context of the Hoa (the Vietnamese term for ethnic Chinese in Vietnam) diaspora in Vietnam. It attempts to employ the concept of ‘hybrid diaspora’ to assist the analysis of their identity change within the wider sphere of two different ethnic-based diasporas. The Việt kiều gốc Hoa are part of both the overseas Chinese diaspora and the global Vietnamese diaspora. Their migrations and return migrations occurred in different periods and politico-economic contexts in contemporary Vietnam. The sense of belonging of these Chinese Vietnamese has a lot to do with their cultural imagination of China as ancestral homeland, as well as with their real-life experiences in Vietnam. The concept of ‘hybrid diaspora’ aptly provides an analytical framework for the multiple migrations and complex life experiences of these returned overseas Chinese Vietnamese.

**The exodus – Vietnamese and Chinese Vietnamese migration**

Towards the end of the Vietnam War, the exodus of the South Vietnamese forces began when it was obvious that the communists of North Vietnam were going to win the war. With the assistance of U.S. flights, many high officials in the South Vietnamese forces left. Besides the operations of evacuation, many others attempted to escape by their own means, either on commercial flights or on boats. One of these latter was a Danish vessel, which carried 3743 Vietnamese on board. It reached Hong Kong in May 1975. Most of the refugees in this first boat people crisis were settled in the U.S. or Europe. It is believed that during this first period, some 150,000 officials and soldiers of the Saigon government fled Vietnam; a number of them were Chinese Vietnamese officials and capitalists.

After the reunification of Vietnam, in order to stop ‘bourgeois practices’ and return salespeople and traders to productive roles, the communist government implemented a series of socialist transformation policies – goods from around 50,000 retailers were confiscated, companies were closed, and many people were ordered to move to the New Economic Zones (NEZs). It was felt that such a policy was directed towards the Chinese communities, particularly those in Ho Chi Minh City, where the Chinese controlled a large part of the commercial capital and activities. Anticipated and actual hardship in the NEZs made many decide to flee. The number of people leaving by boat for Hong Kong and Southeast Asian countries was 5619 by the end of 1976. The total number increased to 21,276 by the end of 1977.
Another refugee crisis occurred from 1977 to 1979, when the China-Vietnam diplomatic relationship deteriorated. This was commonly acknowledged to be the second boat people crisis. An important feature that made this second boat people crisis distinctive was the ‘ethnic Chinese dimension’: ‘of the boat people arriving in neighboring countries during 1978 and the first half of 1979, an estimated 60–70 percent were ethnic Chinese’. In 1977, Beijing had begun to accuse Vietnam of running a policy of ‘purifying the border areas by expelling the Chinese settlers in the border provinces’. The Vietnamese government had become increasingly sceptical of the loyalty of the large Chinese communities in the north. Many ethnic Chinese were expelled from the party and from official positions in the government. Persons in positions considered essential or sensitive from a security point of Vietnam were replaced by Vietnamese who were not of Chinese descent. In the spring and summer of 1978, massive groups of ethnic Chinese from northern Vietnam began to flee to China.

There were different reasons for the Chinese Vietnamese diplomatic fallout. Following the end of the War, there had been a triangular power struggle between the three communist regimes of China, Vietnam and the Soviet Union. As the relationship between China and the Soviet Union had been deteriorating since the late 1960s, Vietnam’s decision to lean towards the Soviet Union was a clear indication to China that it was no longer a trustworthy partner in Southeast Asia. China then increased its support to Cambodia. Vietnam’s military intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 was an impetus for China’s then-prominent leader, Deng Xiaoping, to determine to teach Vietnam ‘a lesson’, which meant a military operation into the border regions of Vietnam. Chinese sources estimated that, by July 1978, 160,000 Chinese refugees had crossed the Sino-Vietnam border to China. After the northern land border was closed in late 1978, more refugees fled along sea routes. It was believed that the Vietnamese government itself was involved in assisting the refugees’ departures, in what was notoriously known as the ‘big boat’ trade. By mid-1979, a total of 200,000 refugees may have left from the south of Vietnam.

Of those who escaped across land borders to China, many ended up in the refugee farmlands along China’s border regions. Of those who took rough sea voyages to reach Hong Kong or Southeast Asian countries, most were kept in refugee camps for a few months to a number of years before they had a chance to be resettled in a third country in the West. After 1981, although there were still Vietnamese and Chinese Vietnamese refugees leaving Vietnam, the number of people was lower. From 1988 to 1989 there was a third boat people crisis, but most of these people were ethnic Vietnamese from the north of Vietnam. Many fled because of the economic hardship in socialist Vietnam.

To summarise, the immediate effect of the ‘ethnic Chinese dimension’ of the second boat people crisis was the immediate dwindling of the population of the Hoa (the Vietnamese term denoting the ethnic Chinese) in Vietnam. Tran has estimated that there were 1.5 million ethnic Chinese in Vietnam in the mid-1970s, 85% of whom lived in the south. In the 1999 national census, the total ethnic Chinese population of Vietnam was 862,371. In Hanoi and Haiphong, the two northern cities which had had the most ethnic Chinese in the past, there were 1530 and 1229 Chinese, respectively. In Ho Chi Minh City, the number was 428,758. In the 1980s and the 1990s, there were a large number of reports that discussed the Vietnamese refugee saga and the adaptation and integration of refugees in resettlement societies, but in recent years, both academics and the news media have taken note of the growing numbers of returnees to Vietnam. It is to this that we now turn.
The return Vietnamese diaspora

In Vietnam, overseas Vietnamese are officially known as ‘Vietnamese people living in foreign countries’ (người Việt Nam ở nước ngoài). However, the Vietnamese term Việt kiều is more commonly used, both by laypeople and by officials. Việt means Vietnamese, and kiều is a short form of kiều dân, which means ‘Vietnamese who reside abroad’. There are about 3.75 million Việt kiều residing in around 100 countries in the world. Most such ‘overseas Vietnamese’ reside in Western countries and have attained foreign nationality. However, with an increasing number of Vietnamese migrating through labour, marriage and other forms of migration to other Asian destinations, such as Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia, scholars studying the overseas Vietnamese diaspora need to keep track of the rapidly changing population dynamics of overseas Vietnamese. Le has shown updated figures of the top 20 countries with the most Vietnamese migrants. The United States still hosts the largest number of ethnic Vietnamese, with around 1.8 million. The other countries in the top 10 are Cambodia, France, China, Taiwan, Australia, Canada, Germany, Thailand and South Korea.

The term ‘Vietnamese diaspora’ lumps all these overseas Vietnamese under one umbrella. However, as this article points out, there are indeed different ethnic groups among the Vietnamese migrants. Besides ‘ethnic’ differences, another important differentiation should also be noted: as Chan and Tran have stressed, there are ‘refugee Việt kiều’ and ‘government Việt kiều’. The ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese Vietnamese refugee diasporas were formed by the different rounds of boat people who were either the political enemies of the communist regime or refugees who escaped to avoid the government’s harsh policies. However, the ‘government Việt kiều’ were sent by the Vietnamese communist authorities to study or work abroad, mostly in the former Soviet Union bloc. Furthermore, as mentioned, there are also the new Vietnamese migrants, many of whom moved to other Asian countries since the 1990s.

In the first half decade of the 2000s, due to more vigorous economic reforms and encouraging policies for the Việt kiều, the number of Việt kiều returning has been on the rise. More than 500,000 overseas Vietnamese return to visit each year. Around 3500 projects and companies are invested by overseas Vietnamese, reaching a combined registered capital of US$11 billion. With the economic benefits brought by the overseas Vietnamese, the Vietnamese government has been eagerly packaging positive public discourses and policies to appeal to the overseas Vietnamese communities and urge them to return. For example, in January 2003, the government put forward the policy of co-opting Việt kiều back to the Vietnamese ‘whole’ and the construction of ‘great solidarity’ (Đại đoàn kết) of the Vietnamese nation both inside and outside Vietnam. In March 2004, the Political Bureau issued Resolution 36 to validate a new political stand and rhetorical tone welcoming and incorporating overseas Vietnamese back to the motherland to contribute to its development. Following this resolution, a number of favourable measures were adopted for the Việt kiều, including allowing them to register business on local terms, purchase local properties, and apply for 5-year visa exemption permits. Việt kiều have thus become part of the expanded imaginary ‘national body’ – the Việt bào (Vietnamese blood and cells).

Before the turn of the policy and the official attitude, Việt kiều were actually suspected, and discriminated against, both by the local Vietnamese and the government. Many of my Việt kiều informants reported that they had been ridiculed when they interacted with the locals in the early 1990s, and that there were restrictive measures against their return. People’s attitude towards Việt kiều gradually changed, and the official discourse has even narrated them as economic heroes of the country. Popular television programmes produced...
successful stories about the Việt kiều and awarded those who had made great contributions to the ‘Vietnamese homeland’. ‘To further attract and campaign for the return of overseas Vietnamese compatriots (kiều bào)’ has become a major task of the communist party and the central government of Vietnam for the period of 2012–2015. The shift of such policy is obviously made with pragmatic and economic intentions. Although many of the Việt kiều I interviewed remained sceptical about the intentions of the government, the favourable polices have boosted overseas Vietnamese’s interest in returning.

Return of Chinese Vietnamese migrants

Among the returning Việt kiều, there have been Chinese Việt kiều. The Chinese Việt kiều consist of people whose ancestral families migrated to Vietnam at different times and who left Vietnam at different periods by different ways. In the preceding section on Vietnamese migration, I have explained the various boat people crises. However, besides the boat people refugees, there was another group of Chinese Vietnamese who sneaked out of Vietnam before the end of the War. Many of them had familial connections in Hong Kong. Unlike the boat people refugees, their cases were rarely reported.

During the early years of the 1970s, cargo ships sailed frequently between Hong Kong and Vietnam. Many escapees hid in the ships by paying traffickers who were connected to the ship operators. The informants called this way of sneaking away kam chong (冚艙), a Cantonese term meaning ‘being covered in the cargo cabin’. Together with the first batch of boat people refugees who arrived at Hong Kong in 1975, many of these escapees were granted Hong Kong identity cards in 1976. Records from Hong Kong government showed that there were around 5000 from this group. Some informants estimated that there should be at least 10,000 who came from Vietnam to Hong Kong in this way. One informant recalled:

Once upon arrival at the Hong Kong shore, we would be arranged by the traffickers to change clothes and hide for a few days until we got in touch with our relatives in Hong Kong. In those years, there was at least one ship leaving Vietnam for Hong Kong every month. On each ship, a hundred to a few hundred people hid in the cabin. There should be at least ten thousand people who had gone like this.

In the pool of my Chinese Việt kiều informants, there were migrants returning to Vietnam from Asian places such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as from different countries in the West. In 2004, some returned Chinese Việt kiều businesspeople aligned with each other to establish the ‘Chinese Overseas Vietnamese Business Association’ in Ho Chi Minh City (Chi hội doanh nghiệp Việt kiều người Hoa in Vietnamese; huaren yueqiao qiye hui in Chinese), which is a branch of the ‘Overseas Vietnamese Business Association’. With this association, the Chinese Việt kiều are now able to distinguish themselves from the business associations of the Vietnamese Việt kiều and from other Chinese businesspeople, such as those from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The chairpersons and vice chairpersons of the association over the past years have come from different places, including Canada, the United States, France, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the first few years of its establishment, there were more than 100 members. In recent years, due to the diplomatic disputes between China and Vietnam on the outlying Spratly and Paracel Islands, the association has become less active, and the number of its members has decreased. In the following section, I will detail several different cases of Chinese Việt kiều. Not all of them are members of the ‘Chinese Overseas Vietnamese Business Association’. These cases will illustrate the
multiple identifications of the Chinese overseas Vietnamese and how they relate themselves to both the Chinese and Vietnamese diasporas.

‘In China, I am a Hoa kiều, and in Vietnam, I am a Việt kiều’

Mr Lu⁴⁶ was one of the kam chong escapees. He grew up and lived with his mother in Saigon. He was an electric wire worker before he left Vietnam in 1972. Because of the urging of his mother, he finally made the decision to go to Hong Kong. After reaching Hong Kong, he stayed at a relative’s place for a while before he rented his own place. In the early 1970s, it was not hard to find jobs in Hong Kong, even without identity cards. However, Mr Lu was discriminated against by the local bosses. He said, ‘We vietnamdzai (越南仔, Cantonese phrase meaning men from Vietnam) were being discriminated against. The dailukdzai (大陸仔, Cantonese phrase meaning men from mainland China) were paid HK$600, but we just got HK$300.’ After working for a few years, Mr Lu married a Hong Kong woman and had three children with this wife. He was able to save some money for investment. In 1979, after China opened for overseas investment, Mr Lu took this opportunity and went to Guangzhou, his ancestral hometown, to open a factory, but his limited amount of money was soon exhausted because of mismanagement. ‘I came back to Hong Kong to work again, almost like starting from zero.’ In 1989, Mr Lu returned to Vietnam for the first time for a short visit. A few months later, he returned again. This time he was sure that he could get a new start-up in Vietnam. He contacted his friends in Ho Chi Minh City and began to invest in the travel business. He then traded different kinds of products. He now owns a factory producing labels for big companies. In the past two decades, Mr Lu spent most of his time in Vietnam, which affected his relationship with his family in Hong Kong. In Ho Chi Minh City, he married a local Chinese Vietnamese, who had a son with him.

Before returning to Vietnam, Mr Lu had actually been one of those early ‘patriotic’ Hong Kong Chinese investors who went to China to pour in capital, which China at the time desperately needed for boosting the newly opened economy. In the last two decades, he was considered part of the ‘patriotic’ overseas Vietnamese businesspeople who contributed to the economic development of Vietnam. As he said, ‘In China, I am a Hoa kiều, and in Vietnam I am a Việt kiều.’ He failed in the first attempt to launch his own business in China, but succeeded in the second attempt, in Vietnam. He said that although he was a Chinese, all his growing up experiences and memories were of Vietnam. He felt at home in Vietnam. One summer afternoon we had coffee and the following conversation. I asked him how he felt about being a Hoa kiều turned Việt kiều. There was a moment of silence before he answered my question:

Life is like that. Every era has different conditions. The environment changes and things become different. We also change accordingly. We adapt to the environment. These names and identities are not that important. Most important is what is more convenient for our living, for work and for making a living...What other ways do I have? If I did not leave that time, I might have been dead by now!... If I were here at the time of opening...maybe already a billionaire. I was not here, I lost many good opportunities...Because of wars, there was no other way for people like me and my generation to choose from.

‘We are people sojourning to and fro [...]’

Mr Yuan was born in 1957 in Cholon-Saigon. The family was originally from Taiwan. During the 1930s, his grandfather led the whole family out of Taiwan. In Mr Yuan’s word,
the family since then had suffered from ‘four separations and five dispersions’ (四分五散, sifen wusan in Mandarin). The members of the family had moved to different places. Some settled in Vietnam and some went to Indonesia. One brother was in Singapore and a few others were in Thailand. His father took the family to Vietnam and began to work in the ship-building industry in the late 1930s.

Mr Yuan has nine brothers and sisters, and all received good education in Saigon. However, after he studied in the university for one year, Saigon was liberated by the communists. At the time, he was 18 years old. He was sent by the Communist Party to help organise a music troupe. ‘I can drum, they asked me to make a band to perform revolutionary songs …. We earned two dollars for a show.’ He was also once sent to a labour camp for a few weeks and assigned to be the group leader of the Chinese youth there.

Mr Yuan’s elder brother studied in a Taiwanese university in the 1960s and stayed in Taiwan after graduation. Owing to this connection, the whole family moved back to Taiwan in 1981. Although Mr Yuan had completed his university education in Taiwan, he did not want to stay there. In 1996, he moved back to Vietnam and began his trading business between Taiwan and Vietnam. Talking about identity, Mr Yuan told me his story in an excited tone:

We are people sojourning to and fro (僑來僑去 qiaolai qiaoqu, in Mandarin). My family was originally from Taiwan; more exactly, it was from Jinmen. When we reached Vietnam (in the 1930s), we became huaqiao (overseas Chinese). When we moved back to Taiwan (in the 1980s), we were called, by others, waiguo huaqiao (overseas Chinese from abroad). Now, I am back to Vietnam, people called me yueqiao (overseas Vietnamese) […]

Identity is not important to people like us. We have gone through many different situations. Our life is not a calm sea. We had experienced different institutions and regimes. We had once left, and we have returned. We can adapt to many different environments […]

‘I identify myself as Chinese, but my sense of belonging is in Vietnam […]’

Mr Chiu was born in Saigon but left Vietnam in 1974 for Taiwan to further his studies. After Saigon fell to the communists in 1975, Mr Chiu was forced to stay in Taiwan. From Taiwan, he migrated to the United States in the 1980s. The first time he returned to Vietnam was in 1994, when Vietnam was just about to ‘welcome’ foreign investors. However, investment policies at that time were still restrictive. Mr Chiu had to register his company under the name of a local Vietnamese. He soon got into all sorts of financial troubles with his local partner. He wrapped up the business in ruins in 1996 and came to Hong Kong for a couple of years to conduct some trade between Hong Kong and the United States. In 1998 he conducted some trade between Hong Kong and Guangzhou, China. Neither of these efforts got him anywhere. In 2000, he decided to return to Vietnam to make a second attempt. ‘That year, it seemed to me that the government was more open to foreign investors, and things were more flexible.’ The most important incentive for him was the policy of allowing Việt kiều investors to register their businesses on local terms. Mr Chiu said:

In the last few years, many more Chinese who were born in Vietnam or Vietnamese from abroad returned to Vietnam to invest because the government has made some changes. We can now register our businesses 100% in our own names. I had a certificate proving that I was born here, so that I could use my Việt kiều identity to register a business.
Mr Chiu had used his ‘Chinese’ identity to start his unsuccessful business in China. He explained his second return to Vietnam:

It is hard to start something anew in a totally unfamiliar place (like Guangzhou). It will take too much time and money to start up there. I am familiar with the environment and culture in Vietnam, the place I grew up. I don’t need to build a social network from zero. It is easier to find a new path in Vietnam because I know people here.

As a Chinese Việt kiều businessman in Vietnam, Mr Chiu analysed his identity as follows:

I call myself Việt kiều when people ask me about my identity. I am officially and rightfully a Việt kiều. But I mainly mix with the Chinese, such as those who came from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Once I start to talk, people know that I am Chinese; particularly when I am with a group of Chinese businesspeople. We speak in Cantonese. From the way I eat and the way I look, I am Chinese […]

I identify myself as Chinese, but my sense of belonging is in Vietnam … I grew up here in Vietnam, and felt familiar with Vietnam. I have friends, classmates, and relatives here…. Matters like identity are complex. The identity of the Chinese in Vietnam is already complicated, ours (who left and returned) is even more complicated. My identity is also more complicated than other Việt kiều. I often find it hard to explain to foreign businesspeople clearly who I am.

Leaving for freedom, returning for friendship

Mr Ho and Mrs Ho, his wife, returned to Vietnam for retirement after living in Germany for around three decades. Although they saw this return as retirement, they had invested in a restaurant in District One of Ho Chi Minh City, together with some local Chinese Vietnamese who were their close friends during their youthful days in the early 1970s. Mr Ho escaped from Vietnam in 1981 and was stuck in Thailand for two years before he was allowed to go to West Germany. Once in Germany, he immediately applied for the reunion with his family – his wife and four children, who had been left behind in Vietnam. Mrs Ho said she had prayed to Buddha frequently and did not eat meat for a whole year in order to make merits for her family and for early reunion. She and her children finally took the flight to Germany in 1984. One year after her migration, she gave birth to one more child in Germany. ‘It was not easy to raise five kids in Germany,’ she said. Mr Ho was then working at a Chinese restaurant opened by Hong Kong migrants from the New Territories.47 ‘Many Vietnamese like us worked for the sangai lou (Cantonese term for men from the New Territories of Hong Kong) in Germany.’ (When he said this, he meant ‘Chinese Vietnamese’, who could speak Cantonese and communicate with the Cantonese-speaking Hong Kongers.) After some years of working for the Hong Kongers, he opened a small restaurant of his own. ‘It is a hard life’, Mrs Ho said. ‘We worked very long hours every day.’ Mr Ho told me that it was this hardship that had contributed to Mrs Ho’s deteriorating health. ‘When we first heard Vietnam had opened, we wanted to come back to Vietnam immediately.’ In 1994, the couple went back to Vietnam for the first time to visit their friends. After the first visit, the couple returned to Vietnam a few more times. It was after Mrs Ho’s operation in 2007 that the two of them decided to wrap up the restaurant business in Germany and return to Vietnam for retirement. ‘I could not take it any more’, Mrs Ho said, ‘so, we closed it and returned’. Back in Ho Chi Minh City, Mr and Mrs Ho made an investment plan with their childhood friends and neighbours, and finally opened a restaurant in Ho Chi Minh City. In Germany, Mr and Mrs Ho had to take
on most of the work of the restaurant, as it was very expensive to hire workers. Back in Vietnam, the cost of labourers was much lower. All of their five children had grown up and were now working in Germany, yet none of them was willing to continue the restaurant business.

Another informant was Lien, who was a good friend of Mr and Mrs Ho. Her father escaped to Taiwan after the end of the Vietnam War. However, he lost all his papers during the escape. It was not until 1991 that he succeeded in applying for the reunion of his family. Lien was then already married to a Chinese Vietnamese man in Ho Chi Minh City and had two children. As Vietnam was already opened, her husband was not willing to migrate to Taiwan. However, Lien was eager to go in order to provide the children with better education. She moved with two children to Taiwan, leaving her husband in Vietnam. Her husband, like many other Chinese Vietnamese, started his own business in the opening economy. Lien had tried to persuade her husband to go to Taiwan, but before she was able to do so, she returned to Vietnam in the mid-1990s. She explained:

Life is very boring in Taiwan. I did not have any friends there. People just shut themselves up at home in the night to watch television. I had nothing to do […] In Vietnam, I can chat with friends. We are really happy to see each other again […]

Both Mrs Ho and Lien agreed that they had left Vietnam for freedom and to get a foreign passport and that they returned to Vietnam to meet their good friends again.

Chinese migration in Southeast Asia

The Chinese have been one of the most influential migrant populations in Southeast Asia. They started to make contacts with Southeast Asia in the tenth century, when Nanyang trade flourished. With the growth of a large class of traders and seamen specialised in Nanyang trade, the number of Chinese settling in the land of Southeast Asia also increased. The ninetieth century brought a new wave of Chinese migration into Southeast Asian. These were labourers, petty traders and middlemen traders for the colonialists. The identity and economic roles of Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia have been examined by many.

One of the most popular Southeast Asian destinations for Chinese migrants was Vietnam. In the early twentieth century, there were around 117,000 Chinese in Vietnam; their numbers increased to 195,000 in 1921 and to 267,000 in 1931. The Chinese population expanded a lot during the Japanese invasion of China from 1937 to 1943. Many Chinese entered Vietnam through the port of Saigon. It was believed that in the years 1937–1939, the number of new Chinese migrants reached 40,000. In 1943, there were 466,000 Chinese in Vietnam, and by 1954 the population was from 600,000 to 750,000, around 80% of whom lived in the south.49

The levels of Chinese migrants’ acculturation and their ways of adaptation vary from country to country. Generally, the Chinese in Southeast Asia neither assimilate themselves totally to the local culture nor totally set themselves apart from the local peoples. Most Chinese in Southeast Asia have acculturated themselves to a certain degree and at the same time maintained their distinct cultural identities in different ways.50 Gosling uses the term ‘intermediate Chinese’ to denote the Chinese in Southeast Asia, who ‘develop different levels of adaptation, involving a variety of different identities’.51 The intermediate Chinese stress solidarity with the local people but at the same time uphold their
Chineseness when situations allow. ‘By mixing elements of Chinese and indigenous culture, a wide range of intermediate identities can be created, according to the demands of the situation. Situational ethnicity is alive and well among the Chinese in Southeast Asia.’ However, the ‘intermediate Chinese’ have often encountered Southeast Asian cynicism towards their dual identities and possible dual loyalties. Tan has highlighted the persistence of Chinese culture and identity among Southeast Asian Chinese and the reinforcement of ‘Chinese’ plus ‘Southeast Asian’ hybridity once Chinese overseas encounter China or interact with other Chinese from other Southeast Asian countries.

While addressing the variety of experiences of Chinese overseas, especially those in Southeast Asia, Tan attempts to define a more unified area for the study of Chinese diaspora with the concept of ‘Chinese ethnological field’.

Macrao changes in the political economies of the Southeast Asian countries as well as that of China in an era of globalisation are exerting significant impacts on the identity transformation of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Some have argued that there is a growing tendency of re-sinification among the Chinese overseas as China’s power rises in the global economy. The powerful rhetoric of the so-called ‘Asian Values’ has also helped boost the Chinese status worldwide. The discourses on ‘Chinese capitalism’ have even gone further to generate representations of a Chinese economic regime.

Overseas Chinese studies and related writing on Chinese diaspora have contributed greatly to our understanding of the history and cultural changes of Chinese migration in Asia and worldwide. However, under the umbrella of ‘Chinese diaspora’, Chinese-related migration and migrants’ experiences are all placed within a Chinese-oriented cultural frame and discourse. While the Chinese Việt kiều are surely part of the Chinese diaspora, they are also part of the Vietnamese diaspora and share cultural and political experiences with other Vietnamese migrants who have undergone similar life changes in the last few decades.

**Conclusion: Chinese/Vietnamese diaspora**

The Chinese Vietnamese I am examining here were mostly refugee migrants who left their ‘home of origin’ (Vietnam) in times of war and political turmoil. Yet, because of the big changes brought by the political and economic development in Vietnam, they have swiftly recycled their migrations. To the Vietnamese government, as long as they are returning to invest and contribute to Vietnam’s economic development, they are all considered patriotic Việt bào (Vietnam’s compatriots) and are welcomed. The returned Chinese Vietnamese feel great nostalgia for Vietnam. Lien, for example, couldn’t adapt to life in Taiwan and so returned after a few years as a migrant. Back in Vietnam, she could meet her childhood friends and could go singing in the Chinese ‘morning tea’ restaurants in Ho Chi Minh City.

For those who wanted to start businesses, returning to Vietnam surely meant that they got new opportunities for fortune-making. However, they also had intimate, and mixed, feelings towards Vietnam, as it was the place they grew up. While they consider that their basic identity is Chinese, their sense of belonging resides in Vietnam. Return migration allowed Mr Lu to build his second career and a second home. After failing in his first business attempt in China, he succeeded in starting up a new career in his early fifties because of his connections with local people. The business helped him rear his family in Hong Kong and raise a second family in Ho Chi Minh City. Mr Chiu also failed in his early business attempts in Vietnam and in
China. He finally decided to return to Vietnam for a second time to start up business through his acquaintance network.

The dynamic cultural transformation of the overseas Chinese and their shifting movements and life choices within the rapidly changing political economy of Asia have urged us to readjust our analytical framework. The cases here may not easily fit into the claims of the studies of Chinese diaspora enshrining ‘persistence’ of Chinese identity among Chinese overseas. Rather than documenting their experiences neatly within the field of Chinese diaspora, I cannot help refocusing such experiences back to the historical changes and politics of Vietnam in the last few decades. China and the Chinese identity can be a backstage for the identification of the returned Việt kiều gốc Hoa; Vietnam and their life experiences in Vietnam are surely the front stage and the reasons for their moving, suffering, losing and gaining. They left Vietnam in the 1970s and the 1980s in the hope of getting a better life and future, abandoning a second-class ‘Vietnamese’ identity. However, their return to Vietnam since the 1990s in the hope of benefitting within a new political economy in Asia has gained them a ‘privileged’ Vietnamese identity certified by the Vietnamese government. The cycles of movement and identity-laundering have made them unique among overseas Chinese in the Chinese diaspora.

Listening to the stories of their struggles to get out of and return to Vietnam, I realised that all these experiences are peculiar to the peoples of Southeast Asia, especially to those who know a few languages, including different Chinese dialects and one or two Southeast Asian languages. The Việt kiều gốc Hoa are part of the few millions who fled from Vietnam because of various political and economic hardships. Like other overseas Vietnamese, they returned to Vietnam after the opening up of the country and have participated in the shifting games of the Vietnamese diaspora. Yet, as Chinese Việt kiều, their identity is at the same time more complex than that of other, ethnic Vietnamese, Việt kiều. It was their Chinese ethnic background that had put them at risk 30-something years ago. Upon their return, their identity was subtly changed. Living in Vietnam, they mainly mingled with other ‘Chinese’, including local Chinese Vietnamese and other overseas Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Their identity consciousness thus remains shared between two ‘homelands’, neither of which is the settlement state of their first migration – the imagined cultural homeland of China and the material homeland of Vietnam.

Perhaps, the only possible way to understand this complex diaspora more correctly is to allow an untidy set of diasporas based not on a single ethnicity but on the shifting transnational identities of the people against the background of an also rapidly changing political economic environment of different state regimes within the region. Allowing a variegated and hybrid category of diaspora will expand our scholarly imaginations and understanding of the complex structure of feelings and intertwined experiences of the migrants who have consciously or unconsciously helped paint the tapestry of both the Chinese and Vietnamese diasporas. The crosscutting identification and life experiences of the returned Chinese Vietnamese help fertilise a new genre of hybrid diaspora that may enrich the global understanding of East and Southeast Asian migration. As Homi Bhabha has stressed when elaborating on the concept of the ‘Third space’ – ‘the people always exist as a multiple form of identification, waiting to be created and constructed’.55 In the same vein, scholarly frameworks also need to be constantly recreated and reconstructed. The turning of identity of the overseas Chinese Vietnamese from that of Hoa and Hoa kiều to that of Việt kiều has produced meaningful and intriguing cases for the study of identity politics and diasporic movements.
Notes on contributor
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Notes
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3. Vertovec, Transnationalism.
5. Chivallon, Black Diaspora of the Americas.
9. King, Return Migration; Gmelch, “Return Migration.”
11. Chan, “Vietnamese or Chinese.”
12. Ibid, 220.
13. Castles and Miller, The Age of Migration, 12.
14. Haines, “Rethinking the Vietnamese Exodus.”
17. Li, “Vietnam.”
23. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam; Ross, The Indochina Tangle.
28. Ho, “Refugee” or ‘Returnee’?”
31. TCTK, “The Number”.
32. Le, “Top 20 Largest Overseas Vietnamese Communities.”
33. UBVNVNONN, The Overseas Vietnamese Community, 7.
34. See note 32.
35. By taking references from official statistical offices and academic research, Le has estimated the population size of the Vietnamese migrants in different countries as follows: Cambodia
(735,085) France (300,000), China (280,000), Taiwan (190,000), Australia (188,000), Canada (180,130), Germany (125,000), Thailand (119,000) and South Korea (90,931).

36. See note 8.
37. Ibid; Small, “Embodied Economies.”
38. VNA, “Overseas Vietnamese Contribute to Economic Development.”
39. See note 8.
40. Ibid.
42. NVONN, “Campaigning for the Return of Overseas Vietnamese.”
44. In Vietnam, besides the Chinese Việt kiều Business Association, there are at least three more business associations associated with ethnic Chinese. They include ‘Hong Kong Business Association Vietnam’, ‘China Business Association’, and ‘Taiwan Business Association’.
45. All the interviews of the cases took place in Vietnam.
46. All the names of the informants in this article are pseudonyms.
47. Many Hong Kong Chinese, especially the indigenous people from the New Territories of Hong Kong, had emigrated to UK or other parts of Europe during the 1960s and 1970s. Their typical career was running Chinese restaurants or working in them.
48. Wang, A Short History.
50. Tan, Chinese Overseas.
52. Ibid, 3.
53. Tan, Chinese Overseas, 27.
55. Bhabha, “Interview with Homi Bhabha,” 220.

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